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Re: Stan * / ^ 7 . 1 ase No. 20020821-CA '
I o Court Clerk:

'

"
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• • .' '

rhe State submits this letter to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to rule 24(i), - ;.iiRules of Appellate Procedure. During oral argument on August 15, 2003, the Honorable
Judith M. Billings asked counsel for appellant if any Utah appellate decision has addressed
whether a search incident to arrest may be conducted following an arrest that was preceded
by police illegality. The State directs the Court's attention to State v. Tram, 2002 UT 97, 5 '
P.3d 1052 (copy attached), as offering some guidance on this question (also cited in Stabbrief at 12,11.8)
Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney <3eneral

i-ik-luMiies [Stat* i '"'•.*• )
ec. I •.-: i ScppLake Legal Defender Ass'n
Hast 500 South, Ste. 300
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Supreme Court of Utah.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jack James TRANE, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 20010068.
Sept. 17, 2002.

Defendant entered conditional guilty plea in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake, Dennis M. Fuchs, J.,
to possession of controlled substance, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and
defendant petitioned for writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) officers
lawfully arrested defendant for interfering with peace
officer, and (2) because the officers lawfully arrested
defendant, the search incident to arrest, whereby
officers discovered cocaine on defendant's person,
did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or the
State Constitution.
Affirmed.

Fourth Amendment and State Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14.
[5] Searches and Seizures C^>24
349k24 Most Cited Cases
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
Const. Art. 1, § 14.
[6] Arrest €=>71.1(1)
35k71.1(1) Most Cited Cases

Durham, C.J., concurred in result and filed opinion.
One recognized exception to the warrant requirement
is a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon
probable cause under exigent circumstances.

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=^1179
1 lOkl 179 Most Cited Cases

[7] Arrest €=>71.1(7)
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases

On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews the decision of
the Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial
court.

Pursuant to the search incident to a lawful arrest
exception to the warrant requirement, an arresting
officer may, without a warrant, search a person
validly arrested.

[2] Criminal Law €=^1179
110k 1179 Most Cited Cases

[8] Arrest €^>71.1(7)
3 5k71.1 (7) Most Cited Cases

Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals for correctness, affording its legal
conclusions no deference.
[3] Criminal Law € = > i 134(3)
HOkl 13.4(3) Most Cited Cases

For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the
underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need
to be supported by an arrest warrant.
[9] Criminal Law €^>394.4(14)
110k394.4(14) Most Cited Cases

Questions of whether an arrest or a search is
constitutional are questions of law that appellate
court reviews for correctness.

Under search incident to a lawful arrest exception to
warrant requirement, any evidence, including all
evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other
[4] Searches and Seizures C~=>23
than that for which the suspect is arrested, is
349k23 Most Cited Cases
admissible in a criminal trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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arrest a person for any public offense committed or
attempted in presence of any peace officer.
U.C.A.1953, 77-7-2(1).

[10] Criminal Law €^>394.4(4)
110k394.4(4) Most Cited Cases
If an arrest violated a defendant's constitutional rights
under either the Fourth Amendment or the State
Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any
evidence secured incident to that arrest must typically
be excluded from a criminal trial pursuant to the
exclusionary rule. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[11] Arrest € ^ 7 1 . 1 ( 7 )
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases
For purposes of search incident to arrest exception to
warrant requirement, the underlying arrest is lawful if
it is supported by probable cause and authorized by
statute.
[12] Arrest €=^63.4(1)
35k63.4(l) Most Cited Cases
Under both the Fourth Amendment and State
Constitution, an officer must have probable cause
before the officer can effect a warrantless arrest.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14.
[13] Arrest €=^63.4(1)
35k63.4(l) Most Cited Cases
Federal Constitution permits an officer to arrest a
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to
believe that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense; however, a suspect does not
need to be guilty of the offense for which the officers
arrested the suspect for the officers to have probable
cause to arrest.
[14] Arrest €^63.4(15)
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases
A law enforcement officer has probable cause to
arrest whenever the crime is committed in the
presence of that officer because the observing officer
knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect
committed the crime alleged.
[15] Arrest €^63.4(15)
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases

[16] Arrest € ^ 6 3 . 4 ( 1 5 )
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases
Officers had probable cause and were authorized to
arrest defendant if defendant committed an offense in
officers' presence pursuant to statute providing that
peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person for
any public offense committed or attempted in
presence of any peace officer. U.C.A.1953, 77-72(1).
[17] Arrest €^63.4(15)
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases
Officers had probable cause and statutory
authorization to arrest defendant for interfering with
peace officer because defendant committed this
offense in officers' presence; defendant, having been
informed of officers' intentions to frisk and arrest him
for intoxication and disturbing the peace, began to
physically struggle with officers to prevent them
from frisking or arresting him, defendant's physical
resistance interfered with officers' orders given to
effect arrest and detention, these acts were sufficient
to justify officers' arrest of defendant under
interfering statute, and these events occurred in
officers'presence. U.C.A.1953, 77-7-2(1), 76-8-305.
[18] Obstructing Justice €=^3
282k3 Most Cited Cases
There is no right to physically resist either an arrest
or an order of the police, irrespective of the legality
of the arrest or order, so long as the officers are
within the scope of their authority.
[19] Obstructing Justice € " ^ 3
282k3 Most Cited Cases
Lawfulness of an officer's order or arrest is not
determinative of whether an officer is authorized to
arrest an individual under the interfering with peace
officer statute. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305.
[20] Obstructing Justice € ^ > 3
282k3 Most Cited Cases

The term "public offense" generally includes
misdemeanors as that term is used in statute
To determine when an officer is within the scope of
providing that peace officer may make an arrest
the
officer's
authority
in making arrest, a court must
under authority of a warrant
or
may,
without
warrant,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
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decide whether the officer is doing what he was
employed to do or is engaging in a personal frolic of
his own.
[21] Arrest €^63.4(15)
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases
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Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON, Justice:

Defendant had no right to physically resist officers'
order to submit to a search, given that defendant
knew that officers were police officers conducting a
routine investigation and pursuing official police
business, and officers therefore properly arrested
defendant on that basis; officers were acting within
scope of their authority, they were called by police
dispatch to conduct an investigation in response to a
call from the clerk of a convenience store stating that
man was harassing store's customers, and by
investigating dispatch, officers were complying with
their duties as peace officers, and officers arrived in
their patrol cars. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305.
[22] Arrest €^63.4(15)
35k63.4(15) Most Cited Cases
Officers had probable cause and statutory
authorization to arrest defendant for intoxication
because defendant committed the offense in presence
of the officers; officers heard call from police
dispatch that man was harassing or disturbing
customers at convenience store, and when officers
arrived at store, clerk indicated that defendant was
the individual who had been disturbing others,
officers each individually and independently noticed
that defendant smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs
of intoxication, and officers also noticed that
defendant was intoxicated enough to potentially pose
a danger to himself and others. U.C.A.1953, 77-72(1), 76-9-701(1).
[23] Arrest € ^ 7 1 . 1 ( 7 )
35k71.1(7) Most Cited Cases

U 1 On writ of certiorari, Jack Trane ("Trane") seeks
review of the court of appeals' decision affirming
Trane's conviction of possession of a controlled
substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (2000), in which the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court's denial of Trane's
motion to suppress evidence was proper. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
H 2 At 4:15 a.m. on November 26, 1998, police
dispatch sent out a call that a man was harassing
customers at a Salt Lake City convenience store.
Officer Walter Dobrowolski ("Dobrowolski") was
initially assigned to the call, and Officer Randy
Bushman ("Bushman") was assigned as back-up.
Both officers were experienced with intoxicated
individuals and had experienced situations where
such individuals became violent.
H 3 Bushman arrived first in response to the call.
He noticed Trane standing near the store at a bank of
public telephones. As *1055 Bushman approached
the store, the store clerk pointed at Trane, indicating
that Trane was the focus of the complaint.
| 4 As Bushman approached Trane, he smelled
alcohol emanating from Trane's person and breath.
Bushman suspected that Trane was intoxicated and
possibly disturbing the peace. Bushman observed
that Trane "was a little loud considering the time[
and] location," was behaving in a "tumultuous-type"
manner, was using profanity, and was using his hands
to express himself. Trane "puffed his chest out [and]
took a defensive posture similar to a boxer" toward
Bushman.
Bushman also noticed that Trane was
exhibiting some anger and was uncooperative.

Because the officers lawfully arrested defendant for
both interfering with peace officer and public
intoxication, the search incident to arrest conducted
at the jail, whereby officers discovered cocaine on
T| 5 Bushman requested Trane's identification.
defendant's person, did not violate either the Fourth
Initially, Trane refused to comply, indicating that
Amendment or the State Constitution, and
Bushman needed "to deal with" the store clerk
accordingly, the cocaine discovered during the search
instead of with him.
Specifically, Trane told
was admissible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const.
Bushman
that
he
was
angry
at the store clerk for
Art. 1,§ 14.
refusing to telephone a taxi for him. After Bushman
*1054 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Marian Decker,
explained that Trane was obligated to identify
Asst. Att'y Gen., Jennifer D. Barton, Salt Lake City,
himself,
Trane produced a Utah identification card.
for plaintiff.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
As
Bushman
attempted to take the card, Trane would
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not release his grip on it until Bushman ordered
Trane to relinquish it.
K 6 About the time Bushman obtained the card,
Dobrowolski arrived in his patrol car.
Bushman
asked Dobrowolski to watch Trane while Bushman
returned to his patrol car to check for warrants.
Concerned for Dobrowolski's safety, Bushman told
Dobrowolski that Trane had been " less than
cooperative" and was "trying to talk his way into
jail." Bushman explained, "I didn't want Officer
Dobrowolski to step into something without any
information [that could protect] Dobrowolski's
personal safety." Dobrowolski asked if Trane had
been frisked, and Bushman responded negatively.
f
7 As Dobrowolski approached Trane, Trane
maintained the "stand that he had with" Bushman.
Dobrowolski noticed that Trane was swaying, Trane's
speech was slurred, and Trane's "face had the
appearance of one who was intoxicated." He also
noticed that Trane "smelled of alcohol."
Dobrowolski believed that Trane was disturbing the
peace and intoxicated.
Because Trane was
intoxicated and Bushman had informed Dobrowolski
that Trane was belligerent, Dobrowolski "thought that
the two coupled made [Trane] a possible danger to"
Dobrowolski and decided to frisk Trane to "ensure
that he didn't have any weapons." Dobrowolski asked
Trane to turn around, place his hands behind his
head, interlock his fingers, and submit to a frisk.
\ 8 In response to Dobrowolski's frisk request,
Trane backed up a step, "held his arms away," and
said, "That ain't happening."
After refusing the
initial request to submit to a frisk, Dobrowolski
became "more concerned" that Trane "had something
he didn't want [Dobrowolski] to find that could hurt"
the officers. When Trane refused to comply with a
second command to submit to a frisk, Dobrowolski
informed Trane that if Trane continued to refuse then
Dobrowolski would compel him to submit. Again
Trane refused to comply with Dobrowolski's order.
In response, Dobrowolski told Trane to put his hands
behind his back because he was under arrest "for
failure to comply with [Dobrowolski's] order."
Trane forcibly resisted. Noticing Trane's physical
resistance, Bushman returned to assist Dobrowolski.
Dobrowolski took Trane's right arm and Bushman
took Trane's left arm in an arrest control technique,
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2700 South, ten to twelve feet from where the
struggle commenced, where all three "went to the
ground." The officers struck Trane on the left cheek
and in the ribs a couple of times during the struggle
to protect themselves.
Eventually, Dobrowolski
subdued Trane with pepper spray, enabling the
officers to handcuff Trane.
11 10 The officers arrested Trane for disturbing the
peace, public intoxication, and interfering with a
peace officer. After medical treatment, Dobrowolski
transported Trane to jail. At the jail, Trane resisted
attempts to search him, but a "small bindle" of
cocaine was discovered in his sock
T| 11 The State charged Trane with possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree *1056 felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(2)(a)(i)
(1998); intoxication, a misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999); and
interfering with a peace officer, a misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) (1999).
Trane moved to suppress the cocaine. In the motion
to suppress, Trane argued that the police lacked a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal behavior
to stop him and that therefore "any evidence obtained
by exploitation of the illegal stop must be
suppressed."
In addition, Trane argued that the
officers arrested him without probable cause and that
therefore "the search-incident-to- arrest exception
cannot justify the subsequent jailhouse search" where
the cocaine was discovered.
11 12 1 he trial court concluded that the police had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to initially detain
Trane. The court also concluded that the attempted
frisk "was proper and supported by Officer
Dobrowolski's reasonable concern for his safety."
Finally, the trial court concluded that the police
properly arrested Trane for disobeying a lawful
command to submit to a frisk. The court alternatively
concluded that the arrest was pi oper because the
police had probable cause or "close to probable
cause" to arrest Trane for intoxication. Accordingly,
the trial court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding, "The subsequent jailhouse search of the
defendant is justified and proper as a search incident
to [Trane's] arrest."

K 13 After the trial court denied Trane's motion to
suppress, Trane conditionally pleaded guilty to one
K 9 Trane continued to forcibly resist the officers'
count of unlawful possession of a controlled
attempt to compel him to submit "with some struggle
substance pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange
and some thrashing." As the struggle continued, the
for the dismissal of the intoxication and interfering
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
officers and Trane ended Digitized
up in the
eastbound lanes of
charges.
As part of the agreement, Trane reserved
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the right to appeal the denial ei la* rnohoh w,
suppress.
ai'L appea;eo hi^ *. n\\\ KM. •,: - •• \ •
("osir* ,-t Appeals The >>>-v\ M appeals niled n
unpublished memorandum decision that the case of
American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App
323, 14 P.3d 698. controlled the outcome of this case.
State v. Trane, 2000 I'i App *<>0I «:
Mm, T
33250537. In Pena-Flores, the umit -t appcaN
concluded that an individual can be convicted of
interfering with an officer in violation of section. 768-305 of the Utah Code if (1) the police act within the
scope of their authority, and (2) the police order,
detention, or arrest had. the indicia of lawfulness.
2000 UI App 323 at 1 11 14 P.3d 698. Relying < >n
Pena- Flores, the court of appeals explained that " "a
person can be guilty of interfering with a peace
officer even when the arrest or detention is later
determined to be unlawful,' " Trane, 2000 I IT App
360U, at 2, 2000 WI 33250537 (quoting PenaFlores, 2000 UT App 323 at 1| 11, 14 P.3d 698), and
held that "because the officers were acting within the
scope of their authority and. the arrest had the indicia
of lawfulness," Trane was properly arrested undei
section 76-8-305, the interfering statute. Id. at 2 3
Accordingly, because the court of appeals held that
the arrest was lawful, it affirmed the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the
search incident to arrest was valid. Id. at 1.-3.
Because the court of appeals affirmed the trial coin: t
on that ground, it did not reach the issue of whether
Trane was properly arrested for intoxication. See id.
at 3. Irane then petitioned this court for certiorari,
which we granted.
]\ 15 Trane argues that the court of appeals erred, by
misconstruing the plain language of section. 76-8-305
of the Utah Code because the term, "lawful" in the
statute "requires the police to have a reasonable
suspicion for a search or probable cause for an arrest
before they can arrest persons for interfering" and by
applying Pena-Flores—which he asserts violates the
constitutional ban. against unreasonable searches and
seizures—to this case. Trane also contends thai the
police lacked, probable cause to arrest him ••
intoxication and thus any search incident, to arrest
would be unconstitutional. The State counters that
the trial court held the attempted frisk was justified; •
however, even if its lawfulness is debatable, an
individual has no right to resist an, arrest or a police
order, and therefore the police pi oner h arrested
Trane for violating section 76-8-305. Hie State also
argues that the search at the jail was v; !
u: h
;
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[1][2][ >] 1 :f ( »n juMoran -AC *e\ie\\ vie decision
of the court ot appeals, not the decision of the trial
court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah
1.995); see also Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, H
8, 52 P.3d 1.252. We review the decision of the court
of appeals for correctness, affording its legal
conclusions no deference. State v. James, 2000 I IT
80, 1| 8, 13 P.3d 576. Further, the qi lestions of
whether an. arrest or a search is constitutional are
questions of law that we review for correctness.
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199; State v. Brown, 853 P.2d
**1. S " (Utah 1992).
ANA i. \ ;>r• \PfM H VI ION <• PENA-FI.ORES fO THIS
< \si
• . . use. -fie Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, relying on American Fork
City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 1.4 P.3d 698,
as controlling precedent and concluding that the
officers properly arrested. Trane under the interfering
statute. State v. Trane, 2000 UT App 360U, at 2. The
court of appeals explained, "Under Pena-Flores, an
arrest for interfering with a peace officer is valid '[s|o
long as [ (1) ] a police officer is acting vithin the
scope of his or her authority and [ (2) ] the detention
or arrest has the indicia of being lawful.' " Trar
2000 UT App 360U, at 2 ('alterations in onirir... i
. (quoting Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 a: f
- l
P.3d 698). Trane contends that the court of appeals
wrongly decided Pena- Flores, and even if it did not,
the court of appeals erred in blindly applying PenaFlores to this case. However, we do not need to
decide whether Pena-Flores was wrongly decided
because that case is inapplicable to the instant case.
II 18 1 lie issue in Pena-F lores was whether the
interfering statute, section. 76-8-305 of the Utah,
Code, required a "lawful arrest or detention." 2000
I JT App'323 at 1[ 1.0, 14 P.3d 698 (qu.oti.ng Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1.999)). In the instant case,
' Trane contends that the language of subsection two
of the interfering statute applies only when an arrest
or a detention is lawful. Specifically, Trane contends
that because the interfering statute requires a "lawful
arrest oi detention," the officers could not legally
arrest him under the interfering statute for resistance
to an. i in.la.wfi il order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1f 19 Although Trane's argument is substantially
similar to the issue in Pena-Flores, the case is
inapposite. Pena-Flores specifically addressed when
"a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace
officer" under section 76-8-305. 2000 UT App 323
at 1| 11,14 P.3d 698 (emphasis added). In this case,
Trane was never convicted of violating the interfering
statute. The actual issue in this case is whether the
officers had authority and probable cause to arrest
Trane under the interfering statute. Pena- Flores is
limited to whether an individual can be convicted of
violating the interfering statute and does not apply
when the court is attempting to determine whether
officers lawfully arrested an individual for allegedly
violating the interfering statute.
Nevertheless,
because the decision of the court of appeals may be
sustainable as a search incident to arrest, we now turn
to that issue. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, %
10, 52 P.3d 1158 (holding that appellate court can
affirm lower court if judgment is sustainable on
alternate theory readily apparent from record).
II.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
INCIDENT TO ARREST

OF

SEARCH

K 20 The ultimate question on certiorari review is
whether the police lawfully searched Trane in a
search incident to arrest. [FN1] If the police lawfully
arrested Trane, then the search incident to the arrest
that produced the cocaine was valid and the court of
appeals properly affirmed the trial court's denial of
Trane's motion to suppress.

FN1.
The parties
dispute
whether
Dobrowolski's original attempt to frisk Trane
was constitutional under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968).
However, there is no need to
address this question because the issue in this
case is whether the officers properly arrested
Trane.
The officers never actually
performed the frisk.

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Utah Constitution
provides virtually identical protections:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. [FN2]

FN2. Trane asserted that the officers
contravened both the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Although this court has previously indicated
that the analyses are not identical under these
provisions, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 785 (Utah 1991), Trane did not argue
that the analyses of these constitutional
provisions are dissimilar or distinct as
applied in this case, nor did he argue that the
Utah Constitution affords him greater
protection
than
the
United
States
Constitution.
In Ramirez, we refused to
embark on an independent analysis under the
Utah Constitution when the parties had
neither argued for nor briefed a separate
analysis. We explained:
The parties have not argued for a separate
analysis under article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, and therefore, we address
the issue only under the federal constitution.
However, that is not to suggest that a
separate state constitutional analysis might
not be appropriate.
817 P.2d at 785 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the issues on appeal here will be
analyzed only under the federal constitution
and existing Utah precedent in which this
court has applied article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. State v. Giron, 943 P.2d
1114, 1120-21 (Utah Ct.App.1997); see also
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah
Ct.App.1994) (stating that "an appellate court
can decline to address state constitutional
claims under article I, section 14 if the party
'fails to proffer any explanation as to how
this court's analysis should differ' under this
section from the federal counterpart.")

U 21 It is axiomatic that "the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the
Utah and United States Constitutions is one of the
most fundamental and cherished rights we possess."
State v. *1058 Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah
1998) (footnote omitted). The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be OCR, may contain errors.
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(quoting State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 n. 1
(Utah Ct.App. 1992)).

[4][5][6] H 22 These constitutional provisions
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).
Under these provisions,
"[warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement." Brown, 853 P.2d at 855;
see also State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294
(Utah 1995) (stating that search without approval of
judge is unreasonable unless subject to one of" 'a few
specifically
established
and
well-delineated
exceptions'" (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,
687 (Utah 1990))); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380,
1382 (Utah 1986) ("[W]e note that the warrant
requirement is an important check upon the power of
the State to subject individuals to unreasonable
searches and seizures and is not to be lightly
disregarded."). One such recognized exception is a
search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable
cause under exigent circumstances. [FN3] Brown,
853 P.2d at 855; see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685
(1969); Banks, 720 P.2d at 1383-84; Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37- 13(3)(a) (Supp.2001).

FN3. A search of an arrestee's person is
generally justified and supported by exigent
circumstances. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768
(1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
Such searches are justified to protect the
officers from weapons, to preclude the
destruction or concealment of evidence, and
to prevent escape. Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 116-18, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142
L.Ed.2d 492 (1998); Belton, 453 U.S. at 457,
101 S.Ct. 2860; Banks, 720 P.2d at 1384.
Additionally, in the past we have held that
"exigent circumstances exist when the safety
of police officers is threatened." State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996).
Clearly, exigent circumstances existed here
where Trane began to resist the officers
physically and violently, thereby placing in
question their safety and threatening the
physical well-being of any officers holding
Trane in custody.
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[7][8][9][10] % 23 Pursuant to the search incident to
a lawful arrest exception, "an arresting officer may,
without a warrant, search a person validly arrested."
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct.
2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also State v.
Lopes, *1059 552 P.2d 120, 121- 22 (Utah 1976).
For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the
underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need
to be supported by an arrest warrant. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 41, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10
L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). The United States Supreme
Court explained:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.
It is the fact of the lawful arrest
which establishes the authority to search, and we
hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a "reasonable" search under that
Amendment.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94
S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (emphasis added);
see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627
(stating that "constitutionality of a search incident to
an arrest does not depend on whether there is any
indication that the person arrested possesses weapons
or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing
alone, authorizes a search." (emphasis added)).
Under this exception, any evidence, including all
evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other
than that for which the suspect is arrested, is
admissible in a criminal trial. Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed.
1399 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
However, if an arrest violated a defendant's
constitutional rights under either the Fourth
Amendment or the Utah Constitution or was
otherwise unlawful, then any evidence secured
incident to that arrest must typically be excluded
from a criminal trial pursuant to the exclusionary
rule.
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State
Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28
L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Ker, 374 U.S. at 35, 83 S.Ct.
1623; Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 292; State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).

H
24 In this case, Officers Bushman and
Dobrowolski arrested Trane for interfering with a
peace officer, public intoxication, and disturbing the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
peace.
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the jail, officers searched Trane and discovered
cocaine on his person. Unmistakably, this was a
search incident to an arrest, see United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39
L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (holding that full search of
person incident to arrest can take place after accused
arrives at place of detention); Curd v. City Ct. of
Judsonia, Ark, 141 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir.1998)
(same); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir.1997) (same), but the remaining question is
whether the arrest was lawful, State ex rel K.K.C.,
636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981).
[11] H 25 The underlying arrest is lawful if it is
supported by probable cause and authorized by
statute. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204
(Utah 1995); see also United States v. Trigg, 878
F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989). The United States
Supreme Court explained, "[W]hile a search without
a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a
lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to
support an incidental search, it must be made with
probable cause." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); see
also State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978)
(explaining that arrest justified by probable cause
supports search incident to arrest).
[12][13] f 26 Under both the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, an
officer must have probable cause before the officer
can effect a warrantless arrest. "[T]he [United States]
Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect
without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe
that the suspect has committed or is committing an
offense." DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627.
However, a suspect does not need to be guilty of the
offense for which the officers arrested the suspect for
the officers to have probable cause to arrest. Id.; see
also Henry, 361 U.S. at 102, 80 S.Ct. 168 (stating
that "[e]vidence required to establish guilt is not
necessary" for probable cause to arrest); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93
L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (noting that probable cause to
arrest is less than that which is required to justify
conviction).

Pase 8
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43
L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85
S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar, 338
U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. Similarly, this court
explained that in Utah the determination of whether
the police had probable cause to arrest someone
without a warrant " 'should be made on an objective
standard: whether from the facts known to the
officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly ... be
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
[the officer's] position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense.'" State v.
Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State
v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259,
1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229, 1232-33 (Utah 1996).
[14] Tf 28 A law enforcement officer has probable
cause whenever the crime is committed in the
presence of that officer because the observing officer
knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect
committed the crime alleged. The United States
Supreme Court explained, "If an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence,
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender." Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549
(2001); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 418, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) ("The
cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect
the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was
permitted to arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence...."); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996,
1003 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that officer's
observation of suspect committing misdemeanor
offense afforded officer probable cause and
legitimate basis to arrest suspect).

[15][16] U 29 In harmony with this case law
regarding probable cause for an officer to arrest an
individual, the Utah Code sets forth circumstances
under which an officer can effectuate an arrest:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
% 27 The United States Supreme Court defined
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted
probable cause justifying an arrest as *1060 "facts
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence"
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that
includes all of the physical senses or any device
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances
physical sense, or records the observations of any
shown, that the suspect has committed, is
of the physical sensesf.]
committing, or is about to commit an offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1999) (emphasis
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Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 97 Utah 351,
361- 62, 93 P.2d 455, 460 (1939). The term "public
offense" under section 77-7- 2(1) generally includes
misdemeanors. Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 51112, 251 P. 23, 24-25 (1926).
Accordingly, the
officers had probable cause and were authorized to
arrest Trane if Trane committed an offense in their
presence.

sufficient to justify the officers' arrest of Trane under
the interfering statute. See State v. Gardiner, 814
P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991). Not only did these
events occur in the officers' presence, but they were
directed toward the officers. Because these events
occurred in the presence of the officers, they had
probable cause and were statutorily authorized to
arrest Trane under Utah Code section 77-7-2(1).

A. Arrest For Interfering With Peace Officer

[18] ^f 33 Despite the foregoing, Trane contends that
an individual should not be arrested for violating the
interfering statute when the individual refuses "to
follow an unlawful order." Because Trane struggled
with the officers in this case, Trane's argument
presupposes that an individual can resist, even
physically, an unlawful arrest or order. However, in
Utah there is no right to physically resist either an
arrest or an order of the police, irrespective of the
legality of the arrest or order, so long as the officers
are within the scope of their authority. Gardiner, 814
P.2d at 574; see also State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003,
1006-08 (Utah Ct.App. 1997).

% 30 The officers arrested Trane for interfering with
an officer in violation of section 76-8-305, which
provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that
person or another and interferes with the arrest or
detention by:
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act
required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(1999).
[17] f 31 In this case, the officers had probable
cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for
interfering with an officer because Trane committed
the offense in their presence. As the officers arrived,
they noticed that Trane smelled of alcohol, swayed,
*1061 had slurred speech, and otherwise appeared
intoxicated.
They also noticed that Trane was
"loud," acting in a "tumultuous-type" manner, angry,
and uncooperative. Both officers believed that Trane
was intoxicated and possibly disturbing the peace.
As a result, the officers began seeking to lawfully
arrest or detain Trane for these crimes.
While
detaining Trane to investigate, Dobrowolski
requested that Trane submit to a frisk because
Dobrowolski feared for his and Bushman's safety and
wanted to ascertain whether Trane had any weapons
on his person. Nevertheless, Trane refused to comply
with Dobrowolski's order to turn around, place his
hands on his head, and submit to a frisk.
The
officers then attempted to arrest Trane.

K 34 In Gardiner, a case involving physical
resistance, we noted that the justification for the
common law right to resist an unlawful arrest or
seizure had disappeared and that therefore the right
has been repudiated in Utah. 814 P.2d at 573-74
(stating that right to resist unlawful police conduct
rejected as defense to crime when common law
defenses were supplanted by specifically codifying
recognized defenses).
Quoting the New Mexico
Supreme Court, we stated:
"Self-help measures undertaken by a potential
defendant who objects to the legality of the search
can lead to violence and serious physical injury.
The societal interest in the orderly settlement of
disputes between citizens and their government
outweighs any individual interest in resisting a
questionable search. One can reasonably be asked
to submit peaceably and to take recourse in his
legal remedies."
Id. at 572 (quoting State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583
P.2d 464,466-67 (1978)).

[19] U 35 The law prefers judicial settlement of
disputes over street brawls and altercations, even
when the lawfulness of police conduct is in question.
Suspects should not be the judges of the lawfulness
1f 32 Trane, having been informed of the officers'
of police action, and redress of an unlawful search or
intentions to frisk and arrest him, began to physically
seizure, e.g., an arrest not supported by probable
struggle with the officers to prevent them from
cause or a detention not supported by a reasonable,
frisking or arresting him. Again, Trane's physical
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, is to be
resistance interfered with the officers' orders given to
obtained in a court of law. Accordingly, the
Digitized
by
the
Howard
W.
Hunter
Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clarkof
Lawan
School,
BYU.
effect the arrest and detention.
These acts were
lawfulness
officer's
order or arrest is not
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 10

State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052
determinative of whether an officer is authorized to
arrest an individual under the interfering statute.
[20] [21] H 36 To determine when an officer is
within the scope of the officer's authority, a court
must decide whether the "officer is doing what he or
she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal
frolic of his [or her] own.' " Id. at 574 (quoting
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d
Cir.1967)). In this case, Bushman and Dobrowolski
were acting within the scope of their authority. They
were called just after 4:00 a.m. by dispatch to
conduct an investigation in response to a call from
the clerk of a convenience store, complying with their
duties as peace officers. The officers arrived in their
patrol cars. Although it is unclear from the record
whether the officers were in uniform, Trane knew
that Bushman and Dobrowolski were police officers
conducting a *1062 routine investigation and
pursuing official police business.
Accordingly,
Trane had no right to physically resist the order to
submit to a search, and the officers therefore properly
arrested Trane on that basis. [FN4]

FN4. In her concurrence, Chief Justice
Durham states that the majority somehow
concludes that "a person may never refuse
any order given by an officer, whether that
order be lawful or not, or take any action,
passive as it may be, that might impede an
arrest or detention." Infra f 46. However,
under the facts of this case, our holding
above is based upon the officers having
probable cause to arrest Trane when he
physically and forcefully resisted and does
not make the inference that she suggests.
Chief Justice Durham does not point to any
wording in which we "unnecessarily suggest
that the police many never be limited or
questioned when making an arrest," infra U
46, nor can she because our opinion is
limited to the facts of this case.

B. Arrest for Intoxication

probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication
because the officers did not believe that Trane posed
a danger to himself or anyone else.
A person
commits the crime of public intoxication under the
Utah Code when that person "is under the influence
of alcohol ... to a degree that the person may
endanger himself or another, in a public place ...
where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9- 701(1) (1999).
[22] 1f 38 In this case, the officers had probable
cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for
intoxication because Trane committed the offense in
the presence of the officers. Both officers heard the
call from dispatch that a man was harassing or
disturbing customers at a convenience store. When
Bushman arrived at the store, the clerk indicated that
Trane was the individual who had been disturbing
others. Trane was in a public place: he was outside
the convenience store near a bank of public
telephones.
% 39 As the officers approached Trane, they each
individually and independently noticed that Trane
smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs of
intoxication. For example, Bushman noticed that
Trane was "loud" and behaving in a "tumultuoustype" manner.
Dobrowolski noticed Trane was
swaying, Trane's speech was slurred, and Trane
appeared intoxicated.
[23] f 40 The officers also noticed that Trane was
intoxicated enough to potentially pose a danger to
himself and others. The officers feared for their
safety, recognizing from past experiences with
intoxicated individuals that they could become
violent.
In this case, Trane was angry, was
uncooperative, had "puffed his chest out [and] took a
defensive posture similar to a boxer," and initially
would not release his identification card upon
Bushman's request. Under such circumstances, the
officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for
intoxication.
Therefore, because the officers had
probable cause to arrest Trane for both interfering
with a peace officer and intoxication, the search
incident thereto did not violate either the Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

U 37 The officers also arrested Trane for public
intoxication in violation of section 76-9-701(1) of the
Utah Code. The court of appeals did not reach the
CONCLUSION
trial court's alternate holding that the officers had
probable cause or "close to probable cause" to arrest
f 41 The officers lawfully arrested Trane for both
Trane for intoxication and that therefore the search
interfering with a peace officer and public
incident to arrest that uncovered the cocaine was
intoxication because they were statutorily authorized
by theofficers
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Accordingly, the search incident to that arrest
conducted at the jail was lawful, and the cocaine
discovered during the search was admissible. Thus,
the court of appeals properly affirmed the denial of
Trane's motion to suppress.

U 42 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice
HOWE, and Justice WILKINS concur in Justice
RUSSON's opinion.

DURHAM, Chief Justice, concurring in the result:
K 43 I agree with the majority that the police officers
in this case had probable cause to arrest Trane for
public intoxication.
I therefore concur that the
evidence obtained *1063 in the search incident to that
arrest was properly admitted. The majority goes too
far, however, in determining that one may properly
be arrested for interfering under section 76-8-305
regardless of whether the officer is engaged in a
lawful arrest or detention.
This conclusion is
unnecessary given the court's holding that there was
an independent, lawful basis for the arrest in this
case. Further, the majority's approach implies a rule
that is unnecessarily confusing and overstates our
holding in Gardiner.

K 45 I also cannot agree with the way in which the
majority applies State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568
(Utah 1991), to the statute at issue here. In Gardiner
we held that the common-law right to forcefully
resist an arrest has been repudiated in Utah. Id. at
573.
In that case, the defendant, Gardiner, was
convicted of assaulting an officer, in violation of
section 76-5- 102.4, and interfering with an arresting
officer, in violation of section 76-8-305. Id. at 569.
The defendant punched an officer who was
attempting to make an unlawful search and became
more violent when the officer attempted to arrest
him. Id. We held that a defendant does not have a
right to forcefully resist an arrest, whether the arrest
be lawful or not, so long as the officer is acting
within the scope of his or her authority and with
adequate indicia of authority. Id. at 573-75.
U 46 The statute at issue in the current case prohibits
more than just forcefully resisting an arrest.
It
prohibits interference in three different forms:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act
required by lawful order
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal
to refrain from performing any act that would
impede the arrest or detention.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (2001). The majority,
however, does not refine its holding by tying
Gardiner 's holding to a specific section of the
statute, but rather crafts its ruling broadly, concluding
that "the lawfulness of an officer's order or arrest is
not determinative of whether an officer is authorized
to arrest an individual under the statute." [FN1]
Supra K 35. I would limit the holding to section one
of the statute. While there is wisdom in concluding
that a person does not have a right to forcefully resist
an *1064 arrest, I see no reason also to conclude that
a person may never refuse any order given by an
officer, whether that order be lawful or not, or take
any action, passive as it may be, that might impede
an arrest or detention.
This dicta unnecessarily
suggests that the police may never be limited or
questioned when making an arrest.

H 44 The majority correctly determines that the
court of appeals' decision in Pena-Flores, 2000 UT
App 323, 14 P.3d 698, does not apply to this case. It
does so, however, for the wrong reason. Rather than
distinguishing Pena- Flores on the grounds that the
current case involves a lawful arrest, the majority
complicates the question by observing that PenaFlores addressed what makes for a valid conviction
under the statute, whereas this case considers what
constitutes a proper arrest under the statute. The
majority rationalizes this reading, stating that "a
suspect need not be guilty of the offense for which
the officers arrested the suspect for the officers to
have probable cause to arrest." Supra 1f 26. The
natural implication of the majority's approach is that
different factors may be considered in determining
the propriety of an arrest than are considered when
determining the validity of a verdict under the same
statute. While it is true that we require different
standards of proof for arrest and for conviction, we
have never held that a factor not relevant to weighing
FN1. While the majority styles its holding as
probable cause is determinative in testing a verdict.
applying to the statute as a whole, it does
To the extent that the majority implies that the rule of
specify that Trane violated section two of the
law should vary between arrest and conviction, I
statute. It is perplexing, however, why the
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section two, which prohibits interfering by
"refusal to perform any act required by
lawful order," instead of section one, which
prohibits interference by "force or any
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76- 8-305
(2001). Surely, the plain language of section
two—"required
by
lawful
orderscontemplates that the officer be acting
lawfully. A narrow reading of that section is
also suggested by the requirement that the
officer's order be "necessary to effect the
arrest or detention" and "made by a peace
officer involved in the arrest or detention." I
would hold that Trane's violent acts
constituted a violation of section one, which
applies to both lawful and unlawful arrests,
and leave interpretation of section two for a
case that is squarely on point.

U 47 I would hold that Trane was properly arrested
for public intoxication.
I would save the
interpretation of section 76-8-305 for another day.
END OF DOCUMENT
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